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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
CONSCRIPTION: SOCIAL
CONTRACT, MORAL
OBLIGATION, AND
PROPOSALS
JAMES M. THUNDER*
Just a short time ago it appeared to be the wrong time to write about
the draft. The long Vietnam war was over.' We were committed to a volun-
teer army.' Whatever the outcome of the 1976 presidential elections, the
amnesty issue would be resolved.3 Yet, the debate on the volunteer army
has begun anew' and, in any case, the threat of war may overshadow us
again-accompanied by calls for conscription. I perceive the opportunity
that a post-bellum period presents: a chance to be close enough to remem-
* Member, Bar of Illinois; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; M.A., Religious Studies,
University of Virginia; A.B., University of Notre Dame. My thanks to my wife, Ann. This
article was written while I was employed by the U.S. Department of Justice and published
while employed by the Cook County (Ill.) State's Attorney's Office, but the views expressed
herein are my own.
I The last American troops were withdrawn from Vietnam on March 28, 1973. Presidential
Proclamation No. 4,313, 39 Fed. Reg. 33,293 (1974), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (Supp.
V 1975). North Vietnamese troops entered Saigon on April 30, 1975. N.Y. Times, April 30,
1975, at col. 3.
2Military Selective Service Act, § 1(12), 50 U.S.C. app. § 467(c) (Supp. V 1975) (termination
of induction authority, effective July 1, 1973); Presidential Proclamation No. 4,360, 40 Fed.
Reg. 14,567 (1975), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (Supp. V 1975) (ending selective service
registration, effective March 29, 1975).
President Ford, had he been elected, would not have renewed or expanded his clemency
program. Washington Post, Sept. 16, 1976, § A, at 7, col. 5. Mr. Carter, upon election, acted
upon his campaign promise to provide amnesty. Exec. Order No. 11,967, 42 Fed. Reg. 4,393
(1977); Washington Post, Aug. 18, 1976, at 14, col. 4.
See, eg., L. BASKIR & W. STRAuss, REcONCILIATION AFTER VIETNAM 106 (1977) (five questions
regarding the outlines of any new military manpower policies). Ognibene, A Fair Lottery
Can't Change an Unfair Draft, Washington Post, April 12, 1977, § A, at 19, col. 3; Nunn,
Another Look at the All- Volunteer Force, Washington Post, March 28, 1977, § A, at 19, col.
3; Washington Star, March 21, 1977, at 1, col. 1; Fried, Compulsory Public Service: A Bad
Precedent, Washington Post, March 15, 1977, § A, at 21, col. 2; Binkin, The Draft: Possibili-
ties and Alternatives, Washington Post, March 7, 1977, § A, at 21, col. 2; Chicago Tribune,
March 3, 1977, at 1, col. 1; Chicago Daily News, January 29, 1977, at 14, col. 2 (editorial);
NBC Nightly News, January 25, 1977 (comments by Sen. Stennis, Chairman, Senate Armed
Services Comm., during confirmation hearings of Secretary-Designate of Defense Brown).
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ber but far enough to begin to be dispassionate. 5 So, I write of the theoreti-
cal foundations for conscription and delineate a few proposals.
Although many Americans hold draft offenders in low esteem, my
purpose here is not to dredge up arguments relating to any new amnesty.,
Rather, I will explore the nature of the obligation which draft offenders are
said to have breached by examining the political theory upon which the
proponents of conscription rely. In addition, I will review laws that permit
the use of deadly force by private persons, in order to determine whether
there is a moral obligation, independent of any political theory, to defend
others. Furthermore, I will question whether a breach of one's military
obligation, while a breach of a political obligation and, therefore, usually
morally wrong, is a breach of a supposed general moral obligation to defend
others. In the final analysis, I will demonstrate that no uniquely American
theory of conscription has developed to limit government's use of conscrip-
tion. I will then develop a theory of conscription that accounts for the
attributes of democracy in the United States. Based on this new theory, I
will set forth several proposals for a workable system of conscription.
The analysis and proposals should prompt us to reevaluate our treat-
ment of draft offenders. We as a people should be most hesitant to demand
that one of us kill for the others. It is an extraordinary act of a people
warranted only by extraordinary circumstances. Moreover, we should not
lightly demand something of our fellow citizens knowing that some (per-
haps quite a few) will not comply and, therefore, be regarded with con-
tempt. Additionally, we cannot demand that one of us kill for the others
when the war is unjust-as defined by the law of nations-if we want to
maintain any hope that there is a relationship between the political and
moral orders. Finally, after we have made such a demand and some have
balked, we ought to allow those few to leave the country without fear of
prosecution and, once hostilities have ceased, to return as nonimmigrant
visitors.
THE BASIS FOR CONSCRIPTION: SOCIAL CONTRACT
Only twice in American history has the theoretical basis for conscrip-
tion been explained. The first explanation was proffered during the 1863
Congressional debate on the enactment of the first law which would con-
script individuals directly into federal armies.7 The second was contained
5 See, e.g., Story v. Perkins, 243 F. 997, 1000 (S.D. Ga. 1917), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Perkins,
245 U.S. 390 (1918) ("[alnd beyond and above all is the inherent power of every nation,
however organized, to utilize its every man and its every energy to defend its liberty and to
defeat the migration to its soil of mighty nations of ferocious warriors, whose barbarous
inhumanity for three years has surpassed all others since the death of Attila, the Scourge of
God.").
' For a discussion of President Carter's amnesty, see Hansell, Amnesty, Discharge Status
Upgrading and Military Deserters Under the Carter Administration: Selective Redemption,
11 CLEARINGHoUsE REv. 344 (1977).
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 950-1400 (1863) (remarks of Sen. McDougall)
CONSCRIPTION
in the Supreme Court opinion in 1918 on the constitutionality of the Selec-
tive Draft Act.' In both instances, heavy reliance was placed on Vattel, a
European who had written a treatise on international law,' and no substan-
tial departures were made from his theory. From these sources, and from
others,'" surfaces what has heretofore served as the foundation for conscrip-
tion in the United States. The next two paragraphs, although short, consti-
tute a lengthier description of the theory than any other available.
The primary obligation which a government owes the people under its
jurisdiction is the obligation to preserve itself." It is the sine qua non of
all other obligations to the people.'" The basic law of the United States
recognizes this obligation and provides the federal government with var-
ious means to meet it.'" Thus, the federal government possesses the power,
inter alia, to raise armies.'4 Conscription is an appropriate means through
which the power to raise armies is exercised and the duty of self-
preservation is met.15
Conversely, the obligation of the individual is to uphold the govern-
ment.'" Specifically, the individual has the duty to bear arms in the gov-
ernment's defense.' 7 This obligation is supreme'" and universal.'9 The laws
[hereinafter cited as 1863 Debate].
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
E. VATrEL, LE DRorr DES GENS (1758) and E. VATrEL, LAW OF NATboNs (5th ed. 1859) (Eng.
trans.) [hereinafter cited as VATrEL].
10 I use ideas expressed, as dicta, from court decisions. Although they are dicta, they never-
theless represent the thinking of learned men.
" VATrEL, supra note 9, ch. 5, § 14.
12 Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934) ("[gjovernment, federal
and state, each in its own sphere owes a duty to the people within its jurisdiction to preserve
itself in adequate strength to maintain peace and order to assure the just enforcement of
law."); Dunne v. United States, 138 F.2d 137, 140 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 790 (1943)
("[the Constitution expresses clearly the thoughts that the life of the Nation and of the
states and the liberties and welfare of their citizens are to be preserved and that they are to
have the protection of the armed forces . ").
" U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cls. 1, 11-16, 18; art. 4, § 4; amends. V and XIV; see Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) ("[t]he war power of the national government is
'the power to wage war successfully'. (citation omitted)).
', See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12.
's See Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). Note, however, that the Supreme Court
has never dealt explicitly with the constitutionality of a peacetime draft. Holmes v. United
States, 391 U.S. 936, 938 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 387 F.2d 781 (7th
Cir. 1967); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 265 (1934) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring); Comment, Supreme Court Confrontation with Questioned Validity of Peacetime
Draft Legislation Not Forthcoming, 1969 UTAH L. Rv. 252.
Ia VATrEL, supra note 9, ch. 15, § 189 "[C]itizens are obliged to labour with all their might
to promote the welfare and advantage of their country .... ").
11 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918) ("[iut may not be doubted that the
very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal
obligation of the citizen to render military service in case of need and the right to compel it
... "9 (citing VATTFL)); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934);
J. LEACH, THE LAW, THEORY, AND POLrIcs OF NATIONAL CONSCRIPTION IN THE UNITED STATES
200-01 (1943) (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Cal.) (the language of the original state constitu-
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of the United States enable the individual to meet his obligation in one of
three possible ways: voluntary enlistment into federal service, enrollment
in state militias (which are subject to a draft into federal service)," or
conscription directly into federal service. 2'
Thus, the individual's military obligation has been described in theo-
retical terms as resulting from mutual promises between the government
and individuals-a social contract. The basis for conscription presented in
the above two paragraphs is, however, deficient. American theorists have
failed to develop a basis for conscription consonant with fundamental
American political theory. American theorists simply substituted the word
"government" for "state" used in Vattel's analysis. That substitution cor-
rectly emphasized entrenched United States policy which refuses to inden-
tify the government or any particular administration with the Nation.
Nevertheless, it did not go far enough. While the American theory of
nation-to-nation relations may be the same as the European theory (as
represented by Vattel), it does not serve as a sufficient base upon which
to predicate conscription, an important aspect of the relation of the Ameri-
can government to the American people. 2 2 Rather, there is an additional
social contract to be reckoned with when addressing conscription in the
context of American political theory. The traditional American, and essen-
tially European, description of the political theory undergirding conscrip-
tion fails in an essential way because it ignores this additional, yet princi-
pal, social contract.
Two social contracts support the structure of American democracy.2
tions) [hereinafter cited as LEACH]; G. WASHINGTON, The Sentiments on a Peace
Establishment, in 26 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 374-98 (1938).
,' Brief for the United States at 10, Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918); 1863
Debate, supra note 7, at 977, 1221, 1289.
" United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 624 (1931) ("in the last extremity, [the war
powers of the federal government include the power] to compel the armed service of any
citizen in the land- .. "); United States v. Henderson, 180 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950) ("[tlhe framers . .. intended that Congress should have the
power, if necessary, to call on every citizen to come to its aid." (emphasis in original)); Heflin
v. Sanford, 142 F.2d 798, 800 (5th Cir. 1944) (some day an absolutely total effort may be
necessary, with "men, women and children all doing what they can. Such a total call has not
yet been made . . . but [it] is within [the power of the government] .... "); 1863 Debate,
supra note 7, at 1289 ("there is not a human being within the territory of the United States
• . .whom this Government is not capable of taking in its right hand and using for its military
service .... ") (remarks of Rep. Thomas).
Some wars have nearly become "total" efforts. See Roodenko v. United States, 147 F.2d
752, 755 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 891 (1945) ("proper maintenance of agricul-
ture, civilian business, transportation, sanitation, health, and many other civilian activities
are as essential to the successful prosecution of the .. .war effort as the production of
munitions of war and the arming and equipping of the military forces.").
11 Act of May 14, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-286,90 Stat. 517 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 673b (1976)).
21 Military Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451-473 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2 See P. REMEC, THE POSrlON OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ACCORDING TO GROTIus
AND VATrEL (1960).
2 C. ROSSITER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 154 (1953). Social con-
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The first social contract is that which arises between individuals who de-
cide to become a body politic and to fashion a government. 24 To acknowl-
edge the existence of this contract is to affirm the sovereignty of the people.
The second contract, which serves as the sole basis of European theory,
consists of two mutual terms. 5 The first of these terms is the agreement
of the government to protect the body politic and all its members, and the
second term is the agreement of the body politic to defend the government
so that the government may meet its obligations.
When an individual bears arms, he does so to meet these obligations.
Thus, under the first contract, an individual satisfies the obligation to
defend fellow members of the body politic, as if there were no government,
and to defend the government under the second contract. As James Mon-
roe so aptly stated, in an oft-quoted remark: "The Commonwealth has a
right to the service of all its citizens, or rather, the citizens composing the
Commonwealth have a right, collectively and individually to the service
of each other, to repel any danger which may be menaced. '2 6
The first social contract is fundamental to the American conception
of the relationship between a body politic and its government. The Ameri-
can government was created "by the people [and] for the people."'27 The
most reknowned part of the Constitution is not the articles setting out the
doctrine of separation of powers but rather the Bill of Rights which protects
the people from the government." The "European" theory, however, is
tract theory has continuing validity. E.g., J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971) ("the
guiding idea is that the principles of justice for the basic structure of society are the object
of the original agreement.").
" See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.) (the Constitution is to be
regarded as a social compact); B. CHAPIN, THE AMERicAN LAW OF TREASON (1964); J. TUSSMAN,
OBLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC 56 (1960) ("Americans did not invent the social compact
theory of the state . . . [but] fate has strangely tied us to it. We are the people of the
Constitutional Convention, the great debate, the Union-creating ratification. Our constitu-
tion. . . is a written charter of agreements and it begins with 'We, the People.' If in the world
today, we still represent an ideal toward which others move, it is the ideal of a body politic
which . . . lives as a voluntary group whose citizens are parties to the social compact
. ... "); Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship in the Revolutionary Era: The
Idea of Volitional Allegiance, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 208, 225 (1974) ("[c]itizenship in the
new republics was to begin with individual consent."); Mayflower Compact, quoted in Jones,
The Jurisprudence of Contracts, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 43, 46 (1975) ("[w]e . . . covenant and
combine ourselves together into a civil Body Politick .... ").
" See text accompanying notes 11-21 supra. See also LEACH, supra note 17, at 10 (General
Knox, Secretary of War, in submitting a manpower plan to Congress on January 21, 1970,
spoke of military service as resting on the social compact).
" Letter from James Monroe to Senator Giles (October 17, 1814), reprinted in 28 ANNALS OF
CONG. 482, 486 (1814).
" Address by President Lincoln, Gettysburg, Pa. (Nov. 19, 1863), reprinted in R. McGINNIS,
QUOTATIONS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 87 (1977).
" See, e.g. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protection from unreasonable search and seizures); Berlin
Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (Americans abroad protected
from Executive Branch of American government).
It is interesting to point out the dual function served by the militia. Under article 1, § 8,
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premised solely upon the second social contract and, therefore, serves
equally well every government, be it democratic or totalitarian, just or
corrupt.2 When we adhere to the "European" theory, without modifying
it to reflect the first social contract-the best of our political tradi-
tion-then we are responsible for the ability of domestic rebels 0 and for-
eign aggressors 31 to employ conscription with unquestioning obedience by
the people within their territories. Clearly, fundamental American politi-
cal theory will not permit this unbridled use of conscription. Conscription,
as an attribute of statehood, is not unlimited. Some glimmer of this notion
is provided in the Selective Draft Law Cases where the phrase "just gov-
ernment" is used, referring to legitimate government and/or a government
which preserves the liberties of its people. 32
If it is agreed that fundamental United States political theory requires
consideration of the first social contract in devising any sound basis for
conscription, the ramifications must be articulated in order to permit the
design of a system of conscription which accounts for this additional theo-
retical basis. The following are the effects of modifying the "European"
theory to reflect the first social contract, i.e., the sovereignty of the people
and government as agent for the people:33
(1) The individual member of the body politic incurs no obligation to
uphold a government by killing for it when it does not in fact 4 protect his
it served the central government, but under amendment II it served the states vis-A-vis the
central government. See 1863 Debate, supra note 7, at 1363 (remarks of Sen. Bayard). Also,
the states have several times sought to interpose themselves between their citizens and the
federal government. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); LEACH, supra
note 17, at 168-69 (Connecticut and Maryland legislatures).
" See Hearings on S. 4164 Before the Senate Comm. on Military Affairs, 76th Cong., 1st Sess.
148, 187, 197 (1940) (to one witness' argument that the 1940 Act's provisions were, under cover
of protecting democracy, totalitarian, Sen. Minton (later Supreme Court Justice) responded:
"but totalitarianism dictates that; it is dictating the pattern all over the world today. We do
not have anything to do about it."); 1863 Debate, supra note 7, at 1388 (remarks of Sen.
Saulsbury: "if the theory of this bill be the theory of your Government, . . . tell me where is
the difference between your form of government and the most absolute and despotic form of
government on the earth?"); W. MOODY, THE INTRODUCTION OF MILITARY CONSCRIPTION IN
NAPOLEONIC EUROPE 1798-1812 at 389 (1971) (Ph.D. dissertation, Duke U.) ("[tlhe bureau-
cratic machinery and the legal principle of universal liability to service were convenient for
any state.").
See generally A. MOORE, CONSCRIPTION AND CONFLICT IN THE CONFEDERACY (1924); Brooks,
Conscription in the Confederate States of America, 1862-1865, 17 BULL. U. GA. 419 (1917);
Shaw, The Confederate Conscription and Exemption Acts, 6 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 368 (1962).
" See generally G. ZAHN, IN SOLITARY WITNESS (1968) (story of Catholic Austrian peasant who
refused to be inducted).
2 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918).
3 In making these statements I am particularly concerned with the situation of civilian
members of the body politic. The obligations of military members are more complex due to
their enlistment contracts with the government. I do, however, consider some problems in
note 112 infra.
34 It is not enough for the government to rely on the guarantees of the Constitution if those
guarantees have not been implemented in fact. After all, most countries' basic documents
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life, liberty and property. Similarly, the body politic collectively incurs no
obligation to uphold its government when that government fails to protect,
or indeed has actively destroyed, the lives, liberties or properties of its
members. 5 The ultimate value of the American policy is not the preser-
vation of its government but the preservation of its liberty."
(2) Where war is waged by the government solely to preserve itself or
for some other purpose unrelated to protecting the body politic and its
members, the body politic and its members do not incur an obligation to
participate in the waging of the war-at least not to the extent of killing
and risking being killed.1
7
(3) If the government wages war in a manner not in accord with inter-
national law, the obligation of the body politic and its members to partici-
pate therein is at an end.3" No people need morally consent to the contin-
ued existence of a government which breached the international law of
now pay lip-service to individual liberties. President Carter's human rights "campaign" is
really only asking countries to live up to their own basic documents.
Along these same lines, it is difficult to ascertain what was essential to the thinking of
the court in United States v. Henderson, 180 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
963 (1950). Was it the fact that the first amendment was part of the Constitution or the fact
that the government had jealously protected first amendment rights?
" This kind of estoppel is suggested by the following: "Hobbes' appeal to the purpose of the
.political covenant [i.e., protection] provides an avenue for the expansion of the obligations
of the citizens; it also serves, however, to recall a limitation [protection in fact] upon these
obligations .... " H. WARRENDER, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES 114 (1966).
Perhaps an 18-year-old in the year 1991 who was born, notwithstanding an attempted
abortion legalized by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), could claim that he did not owe the
government his life. But more important than individual instances of governmental miscon-
duct (by whatever branch) is a "history of repeated injuries and usurpations" which absolves
a body politic from all allegiance to its government and, at the very least, from allegiance
sufficient to justify unquestioning conscription into that government's armies. See
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, July 4, 1776; Maxey, Loss of Nationality: Individual Choice
or Government Fiat?, 26 ALB. L. REV. 151, 159 (1962). This position was recently reaffirmed
by then Secretary of State Kissinger at the June 1976, meeting of the Organization of Ameri-
can States in Santiago, Chile. Without naming Chile, the Secretary said: "A government that
tramples on the rights of its citizens denies the purpose of its existence." Time, August 16,
1976, at 31, col. 2.
3 See Meiklejohn, The Balancing of Self-Preservation Against Political Freedom, 49 CALIF.
L. REV. 4 (1961). But see Remarks of ex-President Nixon, Frost Interviews (May 19, 1977)
(in wartime the President has extra-legal powers in dealing with dissent).
3' See C. VAN TYNE, THE LETTERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 56 (1968) (the legitimate power to raise
armies must be used toward the great ends intended by them); 14 D. WEBSTER, THE WRITINGS
AND SPEECHES OF DANIEL WEBSTER 61 (1903), reprinted in 86 CONG. REC. app. 5210 (1940).
" The United States has entered into a number of treaties governing warfare. See U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, TREATIES GOVERNING LAND WARFARE (1958) (principally the
1949 Geneva Convention). See also D. BowETr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1958);
I. BROWNLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963); Y. DINSTEIN, THE
DEFENSE OF "OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS" IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); M. GREENSPAN,
THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE (1959); Childress, Francis Lieber's Interpretations of the
Laws of War: General Orders No. 100 in the Context of His Life and Thought, 21 AM. J. JURIS.
34 (1976); Paust, My Lai and Vietnam: Norms, Myths and Leader Responsibility, 57 MIL.
L. REV. 99 (1972).
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war, which contains the lowest standards of human decency. That the
government should abide by international law should be viewed as an
implied term of the social contract.
(4) The sovereign body politic may, for any reason, choose not to
actively support the waging of a particular war." The body politic may
nonetheless permit the government to wage the war on the condition that
the government uses only volunteers.10
(5) Conscription of members of the body politic is limited to situations
of extreme peril or those of the utmost necessity.' The individual liberty
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and its Anglo-Saxon predecessors as con-
tinually refined and understood would tolerate no other policy."2
31 See G. WITHERS, CONSCRIPTION: NECESSITY AND JUSTICE 108 (1972) ("[it was agreed that
the national state of Norway should die for the people rather than the people for the state
[and would capitulate to Nazi Germany]."); LEACH, supra note 17, at 203 (quoting An
Answer To [. .1 Matthew Carey's "The Olive Branch" (1816) (" '[t]he country belongs
to the people, not to the government .... If the people do not choose to defend the country,
theirs is the loss.' ").
," There are two acts of government which ought to be distinguished. The first is the making
of war. The War Powers Resolution of 1973 addressed this first act and provided for the proper
constitutional balance between the executive and legislative branches. See note 50 infra. The
second is conscription. The termination of induction authority in favor of a volunteer army,
supra note 2, concerned this act of government. See United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323,
324 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 972 (1967) ("as a matter of law the congressional
power 'to raise and support armies' and 'to provide and maintain a navy' is a matter quite
distinct from the use which the . . . President may order, or the Congress sanction .... ").
" See United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 908-09 (D. Mass. 1969) ("when a nation is
fighting for its very existence there are public and private interests of great magnitude in
conscripting for the common defense all available resources . . . . But a campaign fought
with limited forces for limited objects with no liklihood of a battlefront within this country
and without a declaration of war is not a claim of comparable magnitude."); J. DUGGAN, THE
LEGISLATIVE AND STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL CONCEPT OF CONSCRIPTION FOR MILI-
TARY SERVICE 68 (1946) (Ph. D. dissertation, Cath. U. of Am.) (remarks of Sen. Reed during
1863 debate: "[conscription] is not democratic, it is autocratic; it is not republican, it is
despotic; it is not American, it is Prussian . . . . It is justifiable in a republic only when the
imminence of danger is such that all rights, privileges, and liberties of the citizen must be
surrendered to preserve the nation."); Noone, The Social Contract and the Idea of Sover-
eignty in Rousseau, 32 J. POL. 696, 700 (1970) (survival).
,1 The history of conscription in the United States, Great Britain, Australia and Canada
reveals a great reluctance on the part of many people, if not their governments, to the use of
the power of conscription. Unfortunately, few opponents to the use of such power have been
able to say more than "it is not necessary" or "it is violative of my liberty." See, e.g., LEACH,
supra note 17, at 259 ("[n]o non-democratic state can point with pride to a more successful
trial of volunteerism [before the 1863 conscription law passed; after passage, only 2-1/2% of
over 2 million were conscripted and only 86,000 employed commutation to avoid conscrip-
tion]."); W. MACKIE, THE CONSCRIPTION CONTROVERSY AND THE END OF LIBERAL POWER IN
ENGLAND, 1905-1916, at 114 n.24 (1966) (Ph.D. dissertation, U. of N.C. at Chapel Hill) (one
man's description of the liberal belief: " 'the Englishman alone is a free man .... Every
act of an Englishman who has not, as a criminal, forfeited his rights as a citizen must be
voluntary; of his own free will only should he surrender his person and his time .... ").
One of the purposes of this article is to articulate some of the limitations on the use of
conscription which stem from the cry of "Liberty! "
CONSCRIPTION
NOTES ON SOCIAL CONTRACT
Several additional points on the theoretical basis for conscription re-
quire mention. First, under the "European" theory every citizen is liable
to military service.' 3 In practice, however, military service is only de-
manded of able-bodied men" and even some of them are traditionally
exempted.
In addition, although every citizen is theoretically liable for military
service, there has historically been a struggle for the proposition that those
liable for military service be represented in the councils of war. In other
words, citizenship is sufficient in theory to impose military obligation, but
participation in the political processes leading to the waging of war is
required in practice. In medieval times, this idea resulted in parliament
demanding that the king receive its consent before making war.46 In the
1970's, this same idea led to the amendment of the U.S. Constitution
which enfranchised eighteen year olds, 7 to the enactment of the War Pow-
E.g., Fleming v. United States, 344 F.2d 912, 915 (10th Cir. 1965); Korte v. United States,
260 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 928 (1959); Clark v. United States,
236 F.2d 13, 23 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956); Richter v. United States, 181
F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 892 (1950).
" There have been challenges to this practice. See, e.g., United States v. Reiser, 394 F. Supp.
1060 (D. Mont. 1975); Note, 1976 Wis. L. REv. 330.
11 Conscientious objectors, ministers, teachers, fathers, government officials, and certain
skilled workers have commonly been exempted from military service. See, e.g., Note, Selec-
tive Service and the 1967 Statute, 40 MIL. L. REy. 996 (1968).
" A. NOYES, THE MILrrARY OBLIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (1930); Keeney, Military Ser-
vice and the Development of Nationalism in England, 1272-1327, 22 SPECULUM [a British
journal of medieval English history] 534 (1947); Powicke, Edward II and Military Obligation,
31 SPECULUM 92 (1956).
1' See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; S. REP. No. 26, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1971) ("[slecond,
[of three principal reasons for this amendment], our 18-year-old citizens have earned the
right to vote because they bear all or most of an adult citizen's responsibilities . . . .Nearly
1 million are serving their country in the Armed Forces. And tens of thousands of young
people have paid the supreme sacrifice in the Indochina War over the past five years.") See
also Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 328-329,8 U.S.C. §§ 1439-1440 (1976) (alien serving
in armed forces eligible for citizenship-which leads to political participation); 117 CONG.
REC. 5803 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy on the self-determination denied the residents of
the District of Columbia despite their fighting for the self-determination of the South Viet-
namese); H. NICKERSON, THE ARMED HORDE 1793-1939, at 15 (1940)(quoting L. TAINE, ORI-
GINES DE LA FRANCE CONTEMPORAINE (1891)) (" '[ulniversal conscript, Military service ...
with its twin brother universal suffrage . . . has mastered all continental Europe . . .with
what promises of massacre and bankruptcy for the Twentieth Century!' "); G. WITHERS,
CONSCRIPTION: NECESSITY AND JUSTICE 106 (1972) (quoting Theodore Sorensen, onetime assist-
ant to President Kennedy: "If taxation without representation is tyranny, conscription with-
out representation is slavery."); Fowler, Political Obligation and the Draft, in OBLIGATION AND
DISSENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICS 46-62 (D. Hanson & R. Fowler eds. 1971) (arguing for
participation in political processes as only action which renders a person liable for a political
obligation such as military service); DeBohigas, Some Opinions on Exemption from Military
Service in Nineteenth Century Europe, 10 COMP. STUD. Soc'v & HIST. 261, 262 (1968)
([clommutation [whereby a fee is paid in substitution for personal service] and censitary
system, i.e., electoral system in which voting is restricted to the propertied classes, are
commonly twin institutions").
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ers Resolution of 19'3,11 and contributed to the Overseas Citizens Voting
Rights Act of 1975.11
One would also expect that only citizens, i.e., members of the body
politic, would have a military obligation. 0 That is not the case. Certain
resident aliens are also bound to bear arms.5' If they refuse, their naturali-
zation is barred.2
- 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (Supp. V 1975). Former President Ford criticized this Resolution.
See Washington Post, April 12, 1977, Sec. A at 5, col. 1. See also Glennon, Strengthening
the War Powers Resolution: The Case for Purse-Strings Restrictions, 60 MINN. L. REv. 1
(1975).
4' See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1873dd to dd-5 (Supp. V 1975); H. REP. No. 649, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1975).
1* See Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 22 (1913) ("[clitizenship ... implies a duty of
allegiance on the part of the member and a duty of protection on the part of thesociety. These
are reciprocal obligations, one being compensation for the other.").
1, Military Selective Service Act, § 5(a), 50 U.S.C. app. § 455(a)(1)(3) (Supp. V 1975) (one
year's residency required for an immigrant to be inducted). See also id. § 3, 50 U.S.C. app. §
453 (Supp. V 1975) (nonimmigrant not liable for registration).
11 Immigration and Nationality Act, § 314, 8 U.S.C. § 1425 (1976) (barring naturalization of
aliens who desert or who are convicted of draft evasion). See also id. § 1426 (barring aliens
from naturalization if they claimed any exemption from the draft). Note that an alien barred
from naturalization cannot be automatically deported if he was eligible for naturalization at
the time he was admitted into the United States. If, however, an alien claims a draft exemp-
tion and departs the United States, even temporarily, he will not be eligible to re-enter. Id.
§ 1182(a)(22).
Aliens from enemy countries may be naturalized during wartime. Id. § 1442. If they are
not naturalized, they may be removed if deemed to be a security risk. 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24
(1970). See also In re Schmidinger, 95 F. Supp. 156 (D. Mass. 1950) (objection to fighting
against native land because brothers had been drafted into enemy army); Ex parte Blaze-
kovic, 248 F. 327 (E.D. Mich. 1918).
Although international law formerly prohibited conscription of aliens, it now permits
conscription on the same grounds that citizens are drafted: reciprocating for protection of-
fered by government. See generally N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 564 (1973);
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 560-73 (1967) (United States bilateral agreements on the draft-
ing of aliens and dual nationals); Stamberg, International Law and the Conscription of
Aliens, 27 ALB. L. Rlv. 11 [hereinafter cited as Stamberg]; Comment, The Status of Aliens
Under United States Draft Laws, 13 HAv. INT'L L.J. 501 (1972); Note, Judicial Review and
Treatment of Aliens Under the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940, 28 VA. L. REv.
624 (1942).
Stamberg rejects the notion of two other scholars, Fitzhugh and Hyde, "that the United
States, in drafting aliens, was only exacting a price for the privilege of residence or citizen-
ship, rather than asserting a right to conscript aliens." Stamberg, supra, at 39. Stamberg
writes: "The most that can perhaps be said is that the United States is claiming a right to
conscript all aliens on the theory that many of them will, sometime in the future, desire to
become citizens." Id. at 41. In any case, the history of conscription of aliens shows a desire
to impose upon resident aliens a burden equal to that of citizens in return for the benefits
and protection they are afforded. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XlV (due process and equal
protection apply to all persons, including aliens); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (bar
admission); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973) (state civil service); Graham v. Ri-
chardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (welfare benefits); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
No doubt some theory would be sought to justify what has been regarded as militarily
necessary due to the sheer number of resident aliens. See 1863 Debate, supra note 7, at 1001
(remarks of Sen. McDougall).
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Finally, to go one step further, one might proffer that a government
could conscript any individual who is in fact protected by it even though
the government is not the individual's own government. Thus, since the
United States is said to be the protector of the Western world, perhaps it
could be theoretically correct to say that the United States could conscript
Canadians, Frenchmen or Japanese and, similarly, that the Soviet Union
could conscript Czechs and Poles. However, it appears that in practice a
stronger bond than mere acquiescence to protection is needed to justify the
imposition of a military obligation on non-resident non-nationals.
MILITARY OBLIGATION AS A MORAL OBLIGATION
Recalling James Monroe's statement that the citizens of a common-
wealth have a right individually to the service of their fellows,3 I must
proceed an additional step in my examination of the theoretical basis of
conscription. Was Monroe's statement limited to a right to services of
individuals qua members of the body politic, or did it extend to the services
of individuals qua individuals? In other words, to what degree is the mili-
tary obligation a moral obligation?
I discuss this question without reference to the debate, which occurred
in the 1960's and 1970's in the context of civil disobedience, on whether
there is a prima facie moral obligation to obey all laws. I limit myself to
examining the underlying moral obligation to obey the particular law of
conscription. There is, let it be said, a moral obligation which underlies
the legal obligation to bear arms. While this assertion contradicts the
jurisprudence of legal positivism which holds that the law creates the
obligation," the historians of conscription support the view that statutory
law never created the military obligation. Rather, statutory law defined
the obligation in terms of duration, territory, arms, pay, etc. 5 It remains
to be considered, then, the specific moral nature of the military obligation.
As we have seen, the conscription laws are predicated upon a constitu-
tional, social, and contractual obligation to serve in the military.58 It is also
'3 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
" See Goldstein v. State, 256 App. Div. 141, 143, 9 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800 (3d Dep't 1939) ("Itlhe
services of a member of the militia are rendered pursuant to an underlying duty which he
constitutionally owes to support his government, either voluntarily or by compulsion if the
legislature so requires.")
5 See Johnson, Toward a Cautious Return to Natural Law: Some Comments on Moral and
Legal Obligation, 14 W. ONT. L. REv. 31 (1975).
'6 In the days before the Norman Conquest of 1066, the Anglo-Saxon civic duties consisted
of what is called the trimodo necessitas: bricgbote (road and bridge repair); burhbote (town
repair, but after the Conquest it came to mean fortress repair), and fyrd (defense). C. HoLus-
TER, THe MIuTARY ORGANIZATION OF NoRMAN ENGLAND 138 (1965); Hollister, The Five-Hide
Unit and the Old English Military Obligation, 36 SPECULUM 61, 66 (1961). The fyrd obligation
was actually of two types. The "great fyrd" was local and defensive, an obligation related to
general allegianct to the Crown, which developed into the Eighteenth Century militia. The
"select fyrd," when summoned by the King, constituted an army. It was summoned on the
basis of a unit called the five-hyde unit and/or on the basis of a personal relation between
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referred to as a political obligation for two reasons. First, it is an obligation
directed towards the body politic, members of that body, and their govern-
ment. Second, the military obligation is directed towards the waging of
war-a political act.5" This social, contractual/political obligation in and
of itself is a moral obligation.58 This is one reason why many Americans
find draft offenses morally repugnant.
In addition to the strict social, contractual/political obligation, there
is what amounts to a quasi-contractual obligation. It, too, is a moral obli-
gation since quasi-contractual legal theory is essentially based on moral
theory. This quasi-contract is most often used, in the context of conscrip-
tion, with respect to aliens. Thus, resident aliens who receive the benefits
of the social contract are morally obliged to bear the burdens." Moreover,
the scope- of this quasi-contract is quite expansive if the term "benefits"
is used to refer not only to protection but also to socio-economic benefits."
The argument is that anyone who has received such benefits is obliged to
thegn (or, "thane") and king. C. HOLLISTER, THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF NORMAN ENGLAND
216, 219 (1965). Thus, we have at least two underlying bases in addition to the general
constitutional basis. Historians use the term "parliament regulated" to describe the theory
that there is an underlying basis for laws requiring armed service. See generally J. FORTESCUE,
DE LAUDIBUS LEaum ANGLIA 169-71 (A. Amos ed. 1825); B. LYON, FROM FIEF TO INDENTURE:
THE TRANSITION FROM FEUDAL TO NON-FEUDAL CONTRACT IN WESTERN EUROPE (1957); A. NOYES,
THE MnrARY OBLIGATION IN MEDIEvAL ENGLAND (1930); A. POOLE, OBLIGATIONS OF SOCIETY IN
THE XII AND XIII CENTURIES (1946); Keeney, Military Service and the Development of Nation-
alism in England, 1272-1327, 22 SPEcULUM 534 (1947); Lewis, The Last Medieval Summons
of the English Feudal Levy, 13 June 1385, 73 ENG. HIsT. REV. 1 (1958); Powicke, Edward II
and Military Obligation, 31 SPECULUM 92 (1956); Sherborne, Indentured Retinues and English
Expeditions to France, 1369-1380, ENG. HIST. REV. 79 (1964).
", See Taffs v. United States, 208 F.2d 329, 331 (8th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 928
(1954) ("[wlar . ..is a struggle of violence by one political entity seeking to overcome or
overthrow another political entity."); W. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 206-07 (6th ed. 1909).
" Noone, The Social Contract and the Idea of Sovereignty in Rousseau, 32 J. POL. 696 (1970).
51 In re Martinez, 73 F. Supp. 101, 109 (W.D. Pa. 1947); W. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 206-07
(6th ed. 1909) (aliens have a moral obligation to assist the government "provided that the
action required of them does not overstep the limits of the police, as distinguished from
political [i.e., military] action . . . .They may be compelled to defend the country against
an external enemy when the existence of social order or of the population itself is threatened,
when, in other words, a state or part of it is threatened by an invasion of savages or uncivilized
nations."). This last phrase appears to be an unworkable standard since every aggressor is
by definition uncivilized. See note 52 supra.
, See L. BASKIR & W. STRAUSS, RECONCILIATION AFTER VIETNAM 81 (1977); Fowler, Political
Obligation and the Draft, in OBLIGATION AND DISSENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO PoLrTcs 46-62 (D.
Hanson & R. Fowler eds. 1971); Murphy, In Defense of Obligation, in POLICAL AND LEGAL
OBLIGATION 36-45 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1970); Skillern, Law, Obligation, and
Morality: What Is the Individual's Responsibility?, 52 ORE. L. REV. 111, 133-34 (1973); Wal-
zer, Political Alienation and Military Service, in POLrnCAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 401-20 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1970); LEACH, supra note 17, at 501 (Mayor Opdyke of New York
said: "[W]e might frankly say to him [a poor man desiring exemption], if you really claim
that because you are poor in property you ought not to be obliged to bear arms for the
Republic, then you ought not to control its policy. If you will not defend, you ought not to
have the power to offend.").
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"pay" for them.2
Yet another type of moral obligation (beyond that of keeping one's
social, contractual/political promises and/or paying for benefits received)
may support the military obligation. "Bearing of arms" is a shorthand
expression for "protect X [individuals, body politic or government] by
using deadly force, that is, by means of killing others." Of course, one may
die in the process, but the obligation is not to die, as one author would have
it,"6 but to kill. Does the military obligation rest upon a general, moral
obligation on the part of the individual to defend others by deadly force?
To answer this, it is useful to examine whether the law requires private
persons to use deadly force to protect others.
PRIVATE PERSONS' USE OF DEADLY FORCE
Various state laws provide the authority to organize a militia, which
includes conscripting private persons. For our purposes, these laws mimic
the federal conscription laws. They are based upon the same social con-
tract theory, merely substituting "state government" for "government" or
"federal government."63 Indeed, a basic argument of the proponents of
" Under this theory, long-time residents of the United States although residing illegally, for
example, Mexicans, could be drafted.
'2 See M. Walzer, The Obligation to Die for the State, in OBUGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDI-
ENCE, WAR & CITIZENSHIP 80 (1970). Walzer propounds the following question: Can an individ-
ual citizen be obligated to make the safety of the state the motive of his voluntary death?
He then discusses Hobbes and Rousseau.
As a Christian, it is easy for me to understand dying for another, perhaps even dying for
an abstraction such as a "country." The more profound question for a Christian, since the
presumption is against giving an affirmative answer, is whether there is an obligation to kill
for another.
'3 See, e.g., Lanahan v. Birge, 30 Conn. 438, 443 (1862) (state militia is the same as federal).
The principal question in the discussion of the constitutionality of federal conscription
laws has not been the power of government in general to conscript but rather the power of
the federal government to conscript, as complicated by the Constitution's militia clauses.
See, e.g., Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918); United States v. Richmond, 274 F.
Supp. 43, 66-75 (C.D. Cal. 1967); Jeffers v. Fair, 33 Ga. 347 (1862); Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa.
238 (1863); Burroughs v. Peyton, 57 Va. (16 Gratt.) 470 (1863) (Confederate conscription);
THE MILITIA: ExTRAcTS FROM THE JOURNALS AND DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTIONS, S. Doc.
No. 695, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. (1917); M. BALDINGR, THE CONSTrrTUIONALrrY AND OPERATION
OF CERTAIN PHASES OF THE SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM (1941); J. DUGGAN, THE LEGISLATIVE AND
STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL CONCEPT OF CONSCRIPTION FOR MILITARY SERVICE
(1946) (S.J.D. dissertation, Cath. U. of Am.); T. HILLHOUSE, THE CONSCmPTION ACT
VINDICATED (1863); A Great Justice on State and Federal Power, 18 TYLER'S Q. HIST. &
GENEALOGICAL REV. 72 (Auchampaugh ed. 1936); Bernstein, Conscription and the Constitu-
tion: The Amazing Case of Kneedler v. Lane, 53 A.B.A.J. 708 (1967); Black, The Selective
Draft Cases-A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Absolutism, 11 B.U. L. REV. 37 (1931);
Delehant, A Judicial Revistation Finds Kneedler v. Lane Not So "Amazing", 53 A.B.A.J.
1132 (1967); Donahoe & Smelser, The Congressional Power to Raise Armies: The Constitu-
tional and Ratifying Convention 1787-1788, 33 REv. POL. 202 (1971); Freeman, The Constitu-
tionality of Direct Federal Military Conscription, 46 IND. L.J. 333 (1971); Friedman,
Conscription and The Constitution: The Original Understanding, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1493
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conscription is that every government has a right to use conscription; it is
an attribute of sovereignty. Each state of the United States is, to this
degree, sovereign. Or, in words better suited to fundamental American
political theory, the people of each state are, to this degree, sovereign.
Since militia duty is based on the social contract, it renders con-
scripted private persons public officials. Therefore, it is not possible to
determine whether it is based, in addition, on a general moral duty to
render aid to others by use of deadly force. It is necessary to look else-
where-to laws where the social contract does not serve as the basis.
Likewise, the private person's police duty does not assist in this re-
gard. By the law of posse comitatus, a sheriff of a county may summon
private persons to assist in the apprehension of wrongdoers." As part of a
posse, the private person is cloaked with the authority of a peace officer
and may, like a police officer, use deadly force. 5 I have found no authority
for the proposition that a posseman is liable for failure to use deadly force
when so commanded,6 as he would certainly be if he were a soldier or
militiaman,"7 but I will assume that such would be the case.
(1969); Malbin, Conscription, The Constitution, and the Framers: An Historical Analysis, 40
FORDHAM L. REV. 805 (1972) (a response to Friedman); Montgomery, The Relation of the
Militia Clause to the Constitutionality of Peacetime Compulsory Universal Military
Training, 31 VA. L. REV. 628 (1945); Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An
Historical Analysis of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961 (1975); Weiner,
The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181 (1940).
" See, e.g., Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1973); State v. Goodman, 449 S.W.2d
656 (Mo. 1970); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 869 (1972); F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 52 (12th ed. C.E. Torcia 1974). See generally E. FISHER, LAWS OF ARREST (1967).
15 Usually this "cloaked with authority" phrase is used in cases where the private person is
being sued. See Note, Criminal Law: Citizen's Arrest in Assistance of Peace Officers: Defen-
ses to Action for Unlawful Arrest and Imprisonment, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 595 (1956).
With respect to a police officer's use of deadly force in making an arrest, see Note,
Justifiable Use of Deadly Force by the Police: A Statutory Survey, 12 WM. & MARY L. REV.
67 (1970). With respect to a private person's use, see Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 1078 (1970).
11 Failure to obey the summons of the sheriff is a crime. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
31-8 (1975); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 869 n.3 (1972); Note, Criminal
Law-Requiring Citizens to Aid a Police Officer, 14 DE PAUL L. REV. 159, 160 n.7 (1964).
Although usually a misdemeanor, it sometimes is given felony treatment. See Morse, The
Criminal Code of Illinois of 1961, 15 DE PAUL L. REV. 27, 46 (1965) (recommending that Illinois
treat it as a felony, like a 1953 Colorado provision).
It is difficult to determine whether the law would encompass the failure of a private
citizen to obey the sheriff's every command. There are no reported Illinois cases. Furthermore,
there were no prosecutions under the statute in the period of 1939-1964. Note, Criminal
Law-Requiring Citizens to Aid a Police Officer, 14 DE PAUL L. REV. 159, 162 n.14 (1964).
Also, the failure to comply with an order such as "shoot to kill" would not seem to violate
any other criminal law, such as misprision of felony. Compare Rosner v. United States, 10
F.2d 675, 676 (2d Cir. 1926) (failure to aid constitutes obstruction of justice) (dictum), with
2 Draft Report of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary to Accompany Draft Criminal Justice
Codification, Revision and Reform Act of 1974, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 315-18 (1974) (misprision
requires active obstruction).
11 E.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 890-892 (1976); UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 90 (willful
disobedience to superior commanding officer; if wartime, death sentence may result); id. art.
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Although there is a clear distinction between police and military du-
ties, 8 both are based on the social contract. Criminal law exists, not to
benefit persons in their private capacities (e.g., as victims of crime), but
in their capacity as members of the body politic." Therefore, with respect
to the police duty of private persons,7" the law provides no assistance on
91 (willful disobedience to a noncommissioned officer); id. art. 92 (dereliction of duty or
failure to obey); see Spak, To Obey or Not to Obey, That Is the Question!, 50 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 435 (1973); cf. E. FISHER, LAWS OF ARREST 359-60 (1967) (to encourage persons to respond
to the ancient hue and cry, a Hundred was civilly liable to victims of crime found therein).
See generally Dwen v. Barry, 483 F.2d 1126, 1128-29 (2d Cir. 1973) (historically, citizens were
responsible for keeping the peace; the unquestioning obedience of the type necessary in the
military is not necessary for an effective police force).
U The distinction between police and military duties has not always been so clear. See C.
HOLLISTER, THE MILITARY ORGANIZATION OF NORMAN ENGLAND 220 (1965); A. NOYES, THE
MILrrARy OBLIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 27 (1930); Keeney, Military Service and the
Development of Nationalism in England, 1272-1327, 22 SPECULUM 534, 539 (1947). One fairly
recent illustration of the confusion is the use by Justice Cardozo of the police duty of a private
citizen in support of the constitutionality of the peacetime draft. Hamilton v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 265 n. (1934).
The most important decision based upon this confusion was the Selective Draft Law
Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918). The Court relied on the state constitutions of the 1770's although,
in fact, those constitutions compelled a militia duty more akin to police duty than to military
duty. Black, The Selective Draft Cases-A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Absolutism, 11
B.U.L. REV. 37, 40 (1931).
This police (internal)/military (external) distinction explains why so many persons balk
at extraterritorial service of the militia. Thus, Elbridge Gerry feared that the militia would
be used in foreign lands to fulfill treaty obligations. LEAcH, supra note 17, at 42-43 (his fears
were well-founded). To mollify such fears in a later age, Secretary of State Monroe proposed
that the conscription being considered for use during the War of 1812 (which most people
knew would assist the government in its invasion of Canada) would be limited to definite
territorial boundaries. LEACH, supra note 17, at 57, 107. There have been numerous occasions
when militiamen have refused to serve outside the United States or even their own state.
Freeman, The Constitutionality of District Federal Military Conscription, 46 IND. L.J. 333,'
342-43 (1971).
One modern illustration of the police/military distinction is the Posse Comitatus Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1385 (1976). See generally Campis, The Civil Disturbance Regulations: Threats Old
and New, 50 IND. L.J. 757 (1975); Engdahl, The New Civil Disturbance Regulations: The
Threat of Military Intervention, 49 IND. L.J. 581 (1974); Furman, Restrictions Upon Use of
the Army Imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act, 7 MI.. L. REV. 85 (1960); Meeks, Illegal Law
Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities in Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 70 MIL. L.
REV. 83 (1975). Cases arising out of the Wounded Knee incident have sought to use the Act
as a defense. E.g., United States v. Jaramillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974), appeal
dismissed, 510 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1975).
s" See Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412, 415 (N.D.
Ala.) (per curiam), aff'd per curiam, 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F.
Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Allen, Legal Duties, 40 YALE L.J. 331, 356-57 (1931)("[t]he
dogma that all the duties enforced by criminal law must be correlated to rights arises from
the fact . . . that very many criminal wrongs are simultaneously wrongs done to individual
self-interests . . . . There is no anomaly in saying that the State has imposed . . . a duty
which is, or is deemed to be, in the interest of individuals generally, but in which no single
individual has such a determinate interest as can be called a correlative right."); notes 71 &
125 infra.
70 Note that I use the term "duty" not "right." The right to use deadly force, even as a private
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the question whether there is a moral obligation, independent of the social
contract, to use deadly force. Thus, the focus must shift to the law of torts,
where the social contract does not play a role.'
The law of torts imposes a legal duty to render aid to those in distress.
This duty, however, is strictly limited. Foremost, a special relationship
must exist between the putative rescuer and the person in danger. In
addition, the rescuer is never required to place himself in danger, so the
rescuer would rarely be required to use deadly force." Tort and criminal
law permit the use of deadly force in defense of others in more varied
circumstances, yet it is noteworthy that this condonation is not due to a
general moral obligation to defend others. Rather, it is due to an extension
of one's right to defend one's self or one's business relations.73
Thus, the law of torts does not resoundingly affirm that there is a
moral obligation on the part of an individual to use deadly force in defense
of others. Although such a moral obligation exists, the courts appear hesi-
tant to enforce it for a number of reasons. For example, some posit that
the moral obligation is not widely accepted, so that it is very nearly limited
to a defense to homicide, while others contend that such a moral obligation
does not lend itself to enforcement due to the lack of a workable standard.
4
I submit that most people believe there is a moral obligation to kill in
defense of others, but it is only required by the law with respect to "others"
generally under the auspices of the social contract. This thesis is evident
in laws which impinge upon the use of deadly force in defense of persons
who reside outside this country.
First, pursuant to international obligations, the United States has
enacted laws which prohibit certain military activities on American terri-
tory which are directed toward an attack on a foreign power. 5 Second,
person in certain circumstances, is clear. See note 65 supra.
"' It could be said that all laws depend upon the social contract since all laws govern the
affairs of the members of the body politic. However, it is clear that criminal law is, in
particular, the result of the social contract. See note 69 supra; note 129 infra. In any case, if
tort law required a private person to use deadly force that would not make the person a public
official.
" See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr.
14 (1976); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 343 (4th ed. 1971); E. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EQurrY AND EQuITABLE REMEDIES 1013 n.8 (1975); Alexander, One Rescuer's Obligation to
Another: The 'Ogopogo' Lands in the Supreme Court of Canada, 22 U. TORONTO L.J. 98
(1972); D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan" Paradigm, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 798 (1975); Annot., 10
A.L.R.3d 619 (1966). See also Feldbrugge, Good and Bad Samaritans: A Comparative Survey
of Criminal Law Provisions Concerning Failure to Rescue, 14 AM. J. CoMP. L. 630 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Feldbrugge].
" See 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 218, at 480 (1957); R.
PERKINS, CRMINAL LAW 993-1022 (2d ed. 1969); W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs § 20 (4th ed. 1971).
' Compare W. LA FAvE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMniAL LAW § 26, at 191 (1972) and W.
PROSSER, LAW OF ToRrs § 41 at 56 n.68 (4th ed. 1971) (no workable standard), with Feld-
brugge, supra note 72 (workable standard does exist).
11 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1976) (prohibition of launching from the United States attacks upon
a foreign power with which the United States is at peace); 18 U.S.C. §§ 958-960 (1976)
(prohibition of recruiting for, or enlisting in, foreign armies).
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enlistment in a foreign army may, under certain circumstances, be cause
for expatriation." Third, one can serve with American armed services over-
seas pursuant to a mutual defense agreement77 or a unilateral act of the
' See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3) (1976).
" The United States has mutual defense agreements with the following countries: Agreement
relating to a military assistance program with memorandum of understanding, May 10, 1964,
United States-Argentina, [1964] 15 U.S.T. 719, T.I.A.S. No. 5594; Agreement relating to the
assurances required under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, Jan. 7, 1952, United States-
Belgium, [1952] 3 U.S.T. 4529, T.I.A.S. No. 2601; Military assistance agreement, Mar. 15,
1952, United States-Brazil, [1952] 4 U.S.T. 170, T.I.A.S. No. 2776; Military assistance
agreement, Apr. 9, 1952, United States-Chile, [1952] 3 U.S.T. 5123, T.I.A.S. No. 2703;
Mutual defense assistance agreement, Jan. 27, 1950, United States-Denmark, [1950] 1
U.S.T. 19, T.I.A.S. No. 2011; Military assistance agreement, Mar. 6, 1953, United States-
Dominican Republic, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 184, T.I.A.S. No. 2777; Agreement relating to mutual
defense assistance, June 13, 1952, United States-Ethiopa, [1952] 3 U.S.T. 5498, T.I.A.S. No.
2751; Mutual defense assistance agreement, Jan. 27, 1950, United States-France, [1950] 1
U.S.T. 32, T.I.A.S. No. 2012; Mutual Defense assistance agreement, June 30, 1955, United
States-Germany, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 5999, T.I.A.S. No. 3443; Agreement concerning military
facilities, Oct. 12, 1953, United States-Greece, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 2189, T.I.A.S. No. 2868;
Agreement relating to military assistance, June 29, 1965, United States-Guinea, [1965] 16
U.S.T. 1073, T.I.A.S. No. 5848; Military assistance agreement, June 18, 1955, United States-
Guatemala, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 2107, T.I.A.S. No. 3283; Military assistance agreement, Jan.
28, 1955, United States-Haiti, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3847, T.I.A.S. No. 3386; Military assistance
agreement, May 20, 1954, United States-Honduras, [1954] 5 U.S.T. 843, T.I.A.S. No. 2975;
Defense agreement pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, May 5, 1951, United States-
Iceland, [19511 2 U.S.T. 1195, T.I.A.S. No. 2266; Mutual defense assistance agreement, May
23, 1950, United States-Iran, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 420, T.I.A.S. No. 2071; Mutual defense assis-
tance agreement, Jan. 27, 1950; United States-Italy, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 50, T.I.A.S. No. 2013;
Mutual defense assistance agreement, Mar. 8, 1954, United States-Japan, [1954] 5 U.S.T.
661, T.I.A.S. No. 2957; Mutual defense assistance agreement, Jan. 26, 1950, United States-
Korea, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 137, T.I.A.S. No. 2019; Agreement relating to mutual defense assis-
tance, Nov. 19, 1951, United States-Liberia, [1951] 3 U.S.T. 2805, T.I.A.S. No. 2450; Mutual
defense assistance agreement, Jan. 27, 1950, United States-Luxembourg, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 69,
T.I.A.S. No. 2014; Mutual defense assistance agreement, Jan. 27, 1950, United States-
Netherlands, [1950] 1 U.S.T. 88, T.I.A.S. No. 2015; Agreement relating to mutual defense
assistance, June 19, 1952, United States-New Zealand, [1952] 3 U.S.T. 4408, T.I.A.S. No.
2590; Mutual defense assistance agreement, Jan. 27, 1950, United States-Norway, [1952] 3
U.S.T. 4639, T.I.A.S. No. 2616; Agreement relating to transfer of military supplies and
equipment to Pakistan, Nov. 29 & Dec. 15, 1950, United States-Pakistan, [1950] 1 U.S.T.
884, T.I.A.S. No. 2165; Military assistance agreement, Feb. 22, 1952, United States-Peru,
[1952] 3 U.S.T. 2890, T.I.A.S. No. 2466; Mutual defense treaty, Aug. 30, 1951, United
States-Philippines, [1951] 3 U.S.T. 3947, T.I.A.S. No. 2529; Mutual defense assistance
agreement, Jan. 5, 1951, United States-Portugal, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 438, T.I.A.S. No. 2187;
Agreement relating to mutual defense assistance, Nov. 9, 1951, United States-South Africa,
[1951] 3 U.S.T. 2565, T.I.A.S. No. 2424; Mutual defense assistance agreement, Sept. 26,
1953, United States-Spain, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1876, T.I.A.S. No. 2849; Agreement relating to
the procurement of reimbursable military equipment, materials or services, July 1, 1952,
Unites States-Sweden, [1952] 3 U.S.T. 2968, T.I.A.S. No. 2480, Agreement relating to the
assurance required by the Mutual Defense Security Act of 1951, Jan. 7, 1952, United States-
Turkey, [1952] 3 U.S.T. 4660, T.I.A.S. No. 2621; Mutual defense assistance agreement, Jan.
27, 1950, United States-United Kingdom, [1950] 1 U.S.T, 126, T.I.A.S. No. 2017; Military
assistance agreement, June 30, 1952, United States-Uruguay, [1952] 4 U.S.T. 197, T.I.A.S.
No. 2778.
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American government. In each of these three situations the law can be
justified by resorting to social contract theory. In the first and the third,
the United States is clearly acting as a body politic in international rela-
tions. The second has been justified because foreign enlistment is deemed
incompatible with membership in the American body politic."8 Thus,
where the social contract bears on the situation, the body politic can forbid
a member to bear arms. Where, however, the social contract does not bear
on the situation, Americans are permitted to proceed abroad in defense of
foreign residents." Such acquiescence indicates recognition of a moral obli-
gation to defend others. Where those "others" are neither members of the
body politic nor persons whom the body politic has been committed to or
against, the body politic lets the individual decide whether he will defend
them.
Another aspect of this question needs to be examined. So far, I have
discussed the obligation in its positive aspect, namely, whether there is a
moral obligation to render military service. More can yet be learned if we
inquire into the negative aspect, namely whether the breach of a military
obligation constitutes the breach of a moral obligation.
BREACH OF MILITARY OBLIGATION AS
BREACH OF MORAL OBLIGATION
Fortunately, there are three areas of law which permit us to probe this
question. First, if the breach of one's military obligation were a breach of
a moral obligation, particularly of the supposed moral obligation to kill in
defense of others, then draft evasion should constitute an act of moral
turpitude, s yet it does not.8'
Note should be taken that the War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 8(a)(2), 50 U.S.C. §
1547(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975), requires that the United States forces not be introduced into
hostilities unless the treaty authorizing such action has first been implemented by legislation.
11 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 349(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a)(3) (1976)
(expatriation for foreign service without approval); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
", See Hart v. United States, 84 F. 799, 805 (3d Cir. 1898) (Acheson, J., dissenting); 11 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 231, 243 (1968) (statement of Attorney General
Robert Kennedy with respect to Cuba; executive order of President F. D. Roosevelt permit-
ting American servicemen to resign from and join Flying Tigers).
" Assuming that moral turpitude relates to mala in se, see W. LA FAVE & A. ScoTr, HANDBOOK
ON CRIMINAL LAW § 6, at 31 (1972), rather than simply fraud, see C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD,
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRODEDURE § 4.14(e) n.75 (1975).
" See C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, § 4.14(e) n.75 (1975)
(violation of draft laws of alien's native country not always an act of moral turpitude so as to
bar admission to this country of one as an immigrant); Note, Admission to the Bar Following
Conviction for Refusal of Induction, 78 YALE L.J. 1352, 1382 (1969); Draft Refusal, Marijuana
and Bar Admission, 57 A.B.A.J. 140, 142-43 (1971) (arguing that draft evasion is not an act
of moral turpitude for bar admission purposes).
Note that the Presidential Clemency Board found expressions of conscientious opposition
to be one valid mitigating factor in 73% of civilian applicant cases. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY
BOARD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
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Second, one would expect at least some of the ninety-five extradition
treaties (all bilateral) of the United States to state that the crime of draft
evasion is an extraditable offense. Yet not one of the treaties does so.82
There are a few possible explanations for this. The first, that draft evasion
may be regarded as a military offense" and military offenses are not listed
in the treaties as extraditable offenses.u However, this does not support
(although it does not deny) the proposition that the breach of a military
obligation is a breach of the moral obligation to kill in defense of others.
The second possible explanation is that draft offenses may be regarded as
political offenses, s5 and political offenses are usually explicitly stated to be
non-extraditable s. 8 An exception to this is made for "relative political of-
CLEMENcY BOARD REPORT]. Only 4% of the same group had non-draft felony convictions. Id.
at 32.
" Conversation with Mr. Murray Stein, Attorney, extradition specialist, Government Regu-
lations and Labor Section, Criminal Division, United States Department of Justice (Spring,
1976) [hereinafter cited as Stein]. The treaties are listed in Cantrell, The Political Offense
Exemption in International Extradition: A Comparison of the United States, Great Britian
and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 777, 819-24 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Cantrell].
11 Of Canada, Great Britain and Sweden, only Sweden most directly confronted the extradi-
tion of Vietnam War draft resisters. Sweden decided not to extradite, citing a history of the
non-extraditable nature of military offenses. Note, Legal Status of American War Resisters
Abroad, 5 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 503, 523 (1972).
" See Stein, supra note 82. Note that, although the United States does not regard draft
evasion, as distinguished from desertion or failure to obey a lawful command, as a military
offense, as long as the country with whom the United States enters as extradition treaty
regards it as such, that is sufficient to keep draft evasion from being listed as an extraditable
offense. See Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542 (1944) (deciding when an individual has
submitted to military jurisdiction in an induction context and, therefore, cannot be prose-
cuted for the civil offense of failure to submit to induction); Franke v. Murray, 248 F. 865
(8th Cir. 1918). But see LEACH, supra note 17, at 245, 269 (when President Lincoln suspended
the writ of habeus corpus on Sept. 24, 1862, he made draft resisters liable to court martial).
u See United States v. Lockwood, 386 F. Supp. 734, 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (government did
not deny that it had not sought extradition of draft evaders; discussion of possible reasons,
therefore, included the possibility that extradition would have been refused on ground
that draft evasion is a political offense); Tate, Draft Evasion and the Problem of Extradi-
tion, 32 ALB. L. REv. 337, 357 (1968); Note, Legal Status of American War Resisters Abroad,
5 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 503, 522 (1972).
" See Cantrell, supra note 82, at 778; Castel and Edwards, Political Offenses: Extradition
and Deportation-Recent Canadian Developments, 13 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 89 (1976); Garcia-
Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses Under the Law of Extradition,
26 U. PrT. L. REV. 65, 83 (1964); Garcia-Mora, War Crimes and the Principle for Non-
Extradition of Political Offenders, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 269, 275-80 (1962); Note, Asylum or
Accessory: The Non-Surrender of Political Offenders by Canada, U. FACULTY L. Ray. 93
(1973); Comment, Non-Extradition for Political Offenses: The Communist Perspective, 11
HAav. INT'L L.J. 191 (1970).
The reasons for non-extradition of political offenses are: (1) avoidance of an unfair trial;
(2) the person sought to be extradited, unlike an ordinary criminal, is less dangerous to the
asylum state; (3) the person's alleged crime, being politically motivated, is wanting in the
malice inherent in other crimes; and (4) the crime is not directed against private individuals.
Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses Under the Law of
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fenses," i.e., those offenses having some element of common law crime. 7
Whether regarded as purely political or relatively political, however, a
description of draft offenses as political agrees with the theory that the
military obligation is a political one"-distinct from most violations of
criminal law. The third possible explanation for draft offenses not being
listed in the treaties as extraditable is that they were not offenses at com-
mon law. Until recently," only common law offenses were listed as extra-
ditable. In fact, extraditable offenses were either simply described as offen-
ses at common law or they were enumerated, only common law offenses
being enumerated. This is a most relevant explanation. While the failure
to respond to a military summons is penalized, 0 none of the major texts
on criminal law list it as being a common law felony offense.9 As felonies
at common law were mala in se, i.e., intrinsically evil acts deserving of
death, 2 one would expect the breach of a moral obligation, said to be
Extradition, 26 U. Prrr. L. REV. 65, 85-88 (1964). But see id. at 87, n.125 (Judge Herlands,
writing for the majority in United States v. Stoblen, 199 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd,
301 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 944 (1972), stated: "A conspiracy to obtain and
transmit American national defense secrets may imperil the lives of all Americans. Such a
crime is, therefore, analogous to a conspiracy to commit mass murder." 199 F. Supp. at 13).
Judge Herlands' statement would suggest that the distinction between a pure and relative
political offense is more abstract than real. He would agree with the views of Feuerbach, note
125 infra.
"T See note 86 supra.
" See Tate, Draft Evasion and the Problem of Extradition, 32 ALB. L. REV. 337, 349 (1968)
(draft evasion is a pure political offense since it is directed against the state alone); text
accompanying note 57 supra.
" Income tax evasion and customs violations are slowly being added to the extradition treat-
ies of the United States. See Stein, supra note 82.
" During the Civil War the penalty was a maximum of $500 and/or 2 years' imprisonment.
Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 25, 12 Stat. 735. The next United States draft law provided
for up to 1 year's imprisionment. Selective Draft Act of 1917, ch. 15, §§ 5, 6, 40 Stat. 80-81.
Presently, the law provides for a maximum of 5 years imprisonment and/or not more than
$10,000. Military Selective Service Act, § 1(11), 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(a) (1970).
"1 See, e.g., R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1969); J. TURNER, KENNY'S OUTLINES
OF CRIMINAL LAW (18th ed. 1962).
In ancient times, the penalty for failure to render armed service was a fine. C. HOLLISTER,
THE MILrrARY ORGANIZATION OF NORMAN ENGLAND 235 (1965) ("fyrdwite"); T. PLUCKNETr, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 235 (5th ed. 1956) (scutage); 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, ch. 1, § 3 (1895)
(scutage). Occasionally, a nobleman (a thegn or "thane") would have to forfeit his lands.
Hollister, The Five-Hide Unit and the Old English Military Obligation, 36 SPECULUM 61, 68
n.57 (1961).
Hobbes and Rousseau, whatever their other differences, both recommended that the
death penalty was consistent with their theories on military obligation. H. WARRENDER, THE
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES 191 (1957); M. WALZER, The Obligation to Die for the State,
in OBLIoATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR & CITIZENSHIP 94 (1970).
Congress believed that expatriation was appropriate punishment for those draft evaders
who chose to avoid the draft by departing from the country. See note 127 infra. See generally
CONSCRIPTION: A WORLD SURVEY: COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE AND RESISTANCE TO IT, app. I,
at 157-64 (D. Prasad & T. Smythe eds. 1968) (listing the penalties for draft refusal).
" See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 6, at 29 (1972).
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supreme,93 to be listed as a felony. Instead, the penalty for breach of mili-
tary obligation has been light. 4 So, it appears that draft evasion is not an
act malum in se, and is not a breach of a substantial moral obligation.
The third and the most telling indication that the breach of one's
military obligation is not also a breach of a moral obligation to kill in
defense of others is this: If war, the natural result of performing a military
obligation, were based on a moral obligation to kill in defense of others,
then the law would not find it easy to permit an individual to assent to
using deadly force in defense of family members and neighbors while at
the same time refusing to participate in war. Yet the law permits this, and
further, finds no inconsistency. One can refuse to perform military duty
and still maintain that there has been no breach of one's moral obligation
to defend others!
"3 See note 18 supra.
" See Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U.S. 542, 559 (1944) ("[it is not] for us to decide whether
the maximum penalty provided by Congress is adequate for those who flout the Act while
the nation fights for its very existence."); notes 92 & 93 supra.
One of the draft reports to accompany a revised Federal Criminal Code stated that
"[slince the purpose of the statute [providing criminal sanctions for draft evasion] is
primarily to encourage men to serve in the armed forces . . . rather than put them in jail,
the policy of . . .the Department of Justice . . .has been to punish principally persistent
refusals to serve." 2 DRAFT REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY TO ACCOMPANY
DRAFT CRIMINAL JUSTICE CODIFICATION, REVISION AND REFORM ACT OF 1974, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
212-13 (1974).
11 United States v. Purvis, 403 F.2d 555, 563 (2d Cir. 1968); see Rosenfeld v. Rumble, 386 F.
Supp. 476, 480 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd, 515 F.2d 498 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 911 (1975)
(citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 448 (1971) (dicta) and Sicurella v. United
States, 348 U.S. 385, 390-91 (1954)). The government, too, finds no inconsistency. Sicurella
v. United States, 348 U.S. 385, 389, n. (1954).
The bearing of arms by civilians in response to an invasion is known as a leve en masse.
See M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 62-64 (1959). See generally Mallison
& Jabri, The Judicial Characteristics of Belligerent Occupation and the Resort to Resistance
by the Civilian Population: Doctrinal Development and Continuity, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
185 (1974).
The views of the defendant in United States v. Haughton, 413 F.2d 736 (9th Cir. 1969),
as summarized by the court, are illustrative of the distinction described in the text:
He states that he accepts the use of force by a community in enforcing its laws because
the members of the community consent to this protection. He also accepts the use of
force if that is the sole method of stopping an individual from committing a "morally
worse . . .act of force" such as murder. But he does not believe in military force by
one community which seeks to "punish" the "guilty" in another community. It is the
use of force in this third sense that is generally known as 'war', and the applicable
statute requires conscientious objection to war, not to all uses of force.
Id. at 741. But see United States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902, 908 (D. Mass. 1969) ("[elvery
man has an interest in the security of the nation. Dissent is possible only in a society strong
enough to repel attack. The conscientious will to resist springs from moral principles. It is
likely to seek a new order in the same society, not anarchy or submission to a hostile power.
Thus conscience rarely wholly disassociates itself from the defense of the ordered society
within which it functions .... ")
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CONCLUSIONS FROM THEORETICAL DISCUSSION
American political theory, taken as a whole, rejects the view that any
government can conscript every citizen and resident alien for any purpose
whatsoever. This being so, the breach of the military obligation, as it is
presently defined, by an individual can not always be a breach of the social
contract. Indeed, it may very well be that the government has breached
the social contract.
Furthermore, even in cases where the draft offender has breached the
social contract, the breach does not necessarily constitute a morally repug-
nant act. Draft evasion constitutes the breach of a moral obligation in the
sense that the offender failed to honor his social contract but draft evasion
is not per se the breach of a general moral obligation to use deadly force
in defense of others. It appears that people generally believe that there is
a moral obligation to use deadly force in defense of others. The law recog-
nizes this obligation, and the need of individuals to satisfy it, by permit-
ting it as a defense to criminal prosecutions and tort suits. The law also
recognizes it by permitting individuals to go abroad and to fight. At the
same time, however, the law does not force the individual to use deadly
force in defense of others, who do not already occupy a special relation to
the individual, except in contexts where the social contract justifies it and
vests the private individual with public authority.
Perhaps one could argue that the social contract provides the neces-
sary "workable standard" which enables us to make concrete the general
moral obligation. If this were so, then the breach of one's military obliga-
tion would necessarily entail breaching the general moral obligation. This,
however, is not the case, since, it has been established that the breach of
the military obligation is not a breach of the general moral obligation.
Therefore, the social contract acts as a means to extend the general moral
obligation to persons who would not normally be the beneficiaries of the
performed obligation. Upon these considerations I base the following four
proposals.
THE PROPOSALS
No. 1: The Referendum
From the theoretical conclusions stated and the noted limitations on
the traditional theory of conscription," one proposal becomes evident-a
referendum on the very waging of a war. 7 However, I do not propose to go
so far. Rather, I support a constitutional amendment (which would bind
the government) or, alternatively, a resolution (which would not be bind-
" See text accompanying notes 33-52 supra.
Ludlow Amendment, 86 CONG. REc. app. 7058 (1941); see Vietnam Peace Peti-
tions-Question of American Policy in Vietnam Permitted on Local Election Ballot, 3 HAV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 183 (1967) (Massachusetts and California).
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ing) which would require a referendum on the use of conscripts in extrater-
ritorial hostilities."5
The mechanics of conducting a referendum would not inhibit the gov-
ernment from waging war. Six months would be given after the commence-
ment of hostilities9 to hold the referendum. During this period conscrip-
tion could be used to raise armies. It would also permit wartime conscrip-
tion to begin in order to meet anticipated future requirements if the refer-
endum were approved. It is possible that the referendum would result in a
negative vote which would restrain the government in acts of war. Given
the American understanding of the relationship between a people and its
government, the restraint would be proper. The degree of restraint would
depend on the circumstances. The government would not be prohibited
from waging the war, but only from using conscripts in that war.0 Further-
"A During World War II, Australia employed conscripts only for home service. Walzer,
Political Alienation and Military Service, in POLITICAL AND LEGAL OBLIGATION 419 n.22 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1970).
My proposed constitutional amendments read as follows:
AmendentL .
Neither the President nor the Congress shall permit individuals who have been con-
scripted into the armed services, to be used in hostilities beyond the borders of the
United States for more than 6 months after the commencement of such hostilities,
unless a referendum on this matter shall have first been held and a 75% majority of
those voting in said referendum shall have voted in favor thereof. If it should fail, use
of conscripted individuals in the hostilities must cease within 2 months thereafter.
Sec. 2. Further referenda shall be held once yearly after the first referendum until
hostilities have terminated.
Sec. 3. The time periods for such referenda may be tolled only during actual
invasion of the territory of any part of the United States.
Sec. 4. Congress shall have the power to enact appropriate legislation to enforce
this amendment.
This amendment must be ratified within 7 years to be effective.
Or:
This Act may be called "The War Powers Resolution II."
The Congress of the United States hereby commits itself to the holding of a
referendum within the first 6 months of the commencement of hostilities engaged in
by forces of the United States outside the territory of the United States on the subject
of the use of conscripted individuals in such hostilities.
This referendum may be styled "A Sense of the People Referendum" and in no
case shall be construed to be a delegation of the power of Congress to declare war and
appropriate funds in support thereof.
" The term "hostilities" is used in favor of "war." The War Powers Resolution of 1973 uses
the term. I use it to avoid the constitutional issue of whether hostilities may be entered into
by the United States without a declaration of war. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S.
1316, 1320 (Douglas, J.), rev'd, 414 U.S. 1321, 1321 (1973) (Marshall, J.) (constitutionality
of the so-called Cambodian incursion); Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886, 886 (1970)
(mem.) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Velvel, The War in Viet Nam, Unconstitutional, Justicia-
ble, and Jurisdictionally Attackable, 16 KAN. L. Rxv. 449 (1968).
10 See LEACH, supra note 17, at 746 n.25 (1647 Agreement of the People: "[Tihe matter of
impressing or constraining any of us to serve in the wars is against our freedom; and therefore
we do not allow it to our Representatives; the rather, because money, being always at their
disposal, they can never want numbers of men apt enough to engage in any just cause."); id.
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more, a negative vote will not result in confusion on the battlefield since
the commander-in-chief would be given two months to remove conscripts
from the war zone, and conscripts could be used outside the war zone.
A supermajority voting provision'"' will ensure that a substantial mi-
nority is not asked to act contrary to its own view of the Nation's good.
The referendum will serve as a prophylactic. Why impose conscription,
knowing some compatriots will refuse to serve based on their view of the
Nation's good,'°2 and therefore, be branded as worthy of contempt, without
very good cause?' °3
It is no answer to this proposal that a similar constitutional amend-
ment failed of adoption at the founding of the Republic.' 4 What may not
have seemed necessary then is so now. Moreover, such an American consti-
tutional development has its analogue in Australia '05 and Canada'06-
at 114 (Senator Golsborough during the 1863 debate: necessity is "the blood-stained plea of
tyrants.").
I Cf. U.S. CoNsT. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring two-thirds vote of Senate on treaty ratification);
Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1971) (approving a supermajority provision when attacked
as violative of equal protection).
,0 Conscription laws invariably raise the fundamental question of whether individuals can
be forced to recognize "their duty"-a duty which the majority defines. See, e.g., 1863 De-
bate, supra note 7, at 1234 (remarks of Rep. Olin: the people would not assent to the Repub-
lic's destruction); LEACH, supra note 17, at 374 (one of the great objects of government is to
compel the nation to do its duty) (quoting N.Y. Times, March 23, 1863, at 4, col. 1); Remarks
of ex-President Nixon on the presidency and wartime dissent, Frost interviews (May 19,
1977).
The most apt statement in this regard can be found in J. TUSSMAN, OBUGATION AND THE
BODY PoLITIc 25 (1960) ("[tlhe consent of the governed is to be governed").
'' See Stone [later Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court], The Conscientious Objector,
21 COLUM. U.Q. 253, 269 (1919) ("both morals and sound policy require that the state should
not violate the conscience of the individual. . . . [NIothing short of the self-preservation of
the state should warrant its violation; and it may well be questioned whether the state which
preserves its life by a settled policy of violation of the conscience of the individual will not in
fact ultimately lose it by the process."). But see Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)
(declining to hold as unconstitutional the statute which excluded from conscientious objector
status those individuals who oppose a particular war on philosophical, political, religious or
sociological grounds).
I" See United States v. Garst, 39 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (the amendment proposed by
the Rhode Island ratifying convention would have limited conscription to general invasion);
LEACH, supra note 17, at 43-45 (suggesting that the Rhode Island amendment, if adopted,
would have had its terms redefined so that "voluntary enlistment" would be implied on the
part of any man who voluntarily took advantage of any of the rights of citizenship; "Thus
America [would] keep its fundamental law abreast of its moods and crusades."); cf. Massa-
chusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971) (state law proscribed military service by state
citizens without a declaration of war within 90 days of the commencement of hostilities); S.J.
Res. 67, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. S11,494 (daily ed. July 11, 1977) (a constitu-
tional amendment to permit initiatives); M. HATrnzw, Foreward to THE DRArr AND ITS
ENEMIES; A DocuMENTARY HISTORY at xiii (J. O'Sullivan & A. Meckler, eds. 1974) (favoring a
constitutional amendment requiring voter approval before imposing draft unless there is a
war or national emergency); Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 27, 1977, at 2 (proposal by Sen.
Griffin: national referendum on Panama Canal Treaty).
,0 See F. SMrrb, THE CONSCRITON PLEBIscrrEs im AuSTRALIA 1916-1917 (1966) (Australians
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countries whose roots are similar to ours.
No. 2: Selective Conscientious Objection and/or "Nuremberg" Defense
There is a plenitude of articles on both selective conscientious objec-
tion'07 and the "Nuremberg" defense, 08 so I will limit my remarks.
Points 2 and 3 of the American theoretical modifications to the
"European" theory of conscription 0 suggest permitting some degree of
conscientious objection by individuals to particular wars and/or the use of
the "Nuremberg" defense to certain criminal law violations. The body
politic acts as an entity (e.g., referenda), through its elected representa-
tives (the usual mode), or through its members (non-elected representa-
tives). The problem is that the government, with which the body politic
(or a substantial portion therof) is sometimes at odds, is run by the body
politic's elected representives. So, allowing individual members to act
upon their deepest convictions regarding war, peace and the Nation's good
does not derogate the prerogatives of the elected representatives. Rather,
this creates a safety valve for the body politic. For the most part, the
majority of the body politic and the government remain free to act as they
desire, leaving the minority with the "right not to kill.""10 The more sub-
voted against conscription).
10 See A. LAURENDEAU, WITNESS FOR QUEBEC 55 (1973) (the 1942 plebiscite is criticized for
asking all Canadians to release the majority party in the Canadian Parliament from a pledge
it made to French-Canadian Members that it would not use conscription in exchange for
French-Canadian support of Canada's entry into World War II on behalf of Britain after
France had already fallen).
,*1 E.g., Cohen & Greenspan, Conscientious Objection, Democratic Theory, and the
Constitution, 29 U. Prrr. L. REv. 389 (1968); Hochstadt, The Right to Exemption from
Military Service of a Conscientious Objector to a Particular War, 3 HAIv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
1 (1967); Macgill, Selective Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54
VA. L. REv. 1355 (1968); O'Brien, Selective Conscientious Objection, 56 GEO. L.J. 1080 (1968);
Potter, Conscientious Objection to Particular Wars, 4 RELIGION & THE PUBLIC ORDER 44
(1968); Redlich, Individual Conscience and the Selective Conscientious Objector: The Right
Not to Kill, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 875 (1969); Silva, The Constitution, The Conscientious Objec-
tor, and the "Just War", 75 DICK. L. REv. 1 (1970); Comment, Selective Conscientious
Objection: The Practical Moral Alternative to Killing, 1 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 113 (1968).
,*' E.g., T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY (1970); D'Amato, Gould
& Woods, War Crimes and Vietnam: The "Nuremberg Defense" and the Military Service
Resister, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1055 (1969); O'Brien, The Law of War, Command Responsibility
and Vietnam, 60 GEO. L.J. 605 (1972); Patterson, The Principles of Niiremberg as a Defense
to Civil Disobedience, 37 Mo. L. REV. 33 (1972); Taylor, The Concept of Justice and the Laws
of War, 13 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 189 (1974); Vietnam and the Nuremberg Principles: A
Colloquy on War Crimes, 5 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 1 (J. Hall & M. Staenberg eds. 1973). See also
Brahms, They Step to a Different Drummer: A Critical Analysis of the Current Department
of Defense Position Vis-A-Vis In-Service Conscientious Objectors, 47 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1970);
Comment, Conscientious Objection: Procedures Governing the In-Service Objector, 37 Mo.
L. REv. 494 (1972).
' Text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra. Point 2 would proscribe wars of aggression.
"' See Redlich, Individual Conscience and the Selective Conscientious Objector: The Right
Not to Kill, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 875 (1969) (an attempt to read constitutional provisions as
creating a right not to kill; unfortunately, limited to undeclared wars fought overseas).
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stantial this minority, the greater the check upon the machinations of the
majority and the government.
I would propose that the "Nuremberg" defense be permitted as an
affirmative defense by individuals charged with certain non-violent draft
and military offenses. Several factors mandate utilization of the
"Nuremberg" defense rather than selective conscientious objection: (1)
International law, although vague at times, provides a more ascertainable
minimum standard than an individual's "sincere moral feelings." (2) Both
well-educated and illiterate individuals could use the defense since, in a
criminal proceeding, legal counsel would be available, whereas in an ad-
ministrative hearing (used to determine Selective Conscientious Objector
status) the well-educated would tend to be favored. (3) Since a criminal
proceeding is a judicial proceeding, some of the vagaries of local adminis-
trative hearings would be eliminated. (4) Sincerity would be measured by
the defendant not the judge, jury or draft board, because the defendant
would already have performed an act which, if not justified by interna-
tional law, would warrant imprisonrent or a fine.
Three aspects of this proposal would favor the prosecution. First, this
"Nuremberg" defense would only be available to prosecutions for non-
violent acts directly related to war. Secondly, before the prosecution would
be required to negate the affirmative defense, the defendant would have
to offer "clear and convincing" evidence of violations of international law.
Thirdly, individual acts, such as the My Lai Massacre, would not render
the entire war unjust (although it does so in theory) for the purposes of
proving up the defense. The lone exception to this rule would be an act
which "shocks the conscience" and which was ordered by the high com-
mand. " Of course, a number of individual acts which together constituted
a systematic violation of international law would be sufficient to sustain
the defense.
Two aspects of the proposal would particularly aid the defendant.
First, the defense would be permitted in cases other than that of a prosecu-
tion for refusal to obey combat orders." 2 Secondly, the international law
See Vietnam and the Nuremberg Principles: A Colloguy on War Crimes, 5 RuT.-CAM. L.J.
1, 5-7 (J. Hall & M. Staenberg eds. 1973) (remarks of T. Taylor suggesting these distinctions).
"I Six kinds of cases have been listed where the Nuremberg defense was used. D'Amato,
Gould & Woods, War Crimes and Vietnam: The "Nuremberg Defense" and the Military
Service Resister, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 1055, 1105 n.302 (1969). (1) Refusal of Induction. I would
permit the defense here in order to act as a check on the government and, secondly, to avoid
a later in-service problem, see point 4 infra, notwithstanding that an inductee may not be
sent to the war zone. See United States v. Mitchell, 369 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 972 (1967). (2) Counseling draft evasion. I would permit the defense here but would
limit it to one who counsels the putative draftee that a Nuremberg defense might be avail-
able. (3) Destroying draft records. I would not permit the defense here since the act is
insufficiently connected with a direct involvement of the defendant with war crimes or crimes
against the peace. (4) Refusal to obey order to report to war zone. I would not permit the
defense here because of the need for military discipline. Note that I would permit the defense
under point 1, supra, and point 6, infra, however. (5) Civil action by soldier to avoid training
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which a defendant would seek to prove had been violated would include
both the law related to war crimes (i.e., jus in bello, dealing with methods
of warfare, treatment of civilians and prisoners-of-war, etc.) and the law
regarding crimes against peace (i.e., jus ad bellum)."3
No. 3: Emigration of Draft Offenders
Congress should enact a law"' or the President should issue an execu-
tive order' which would pardon any person indicted for, or convicted of,
non-violent draft offenses on the condition that the person renounce his
citizenship and emigrate to a friendly or neutral nation."' Such a condi-
tional pardon has American precedents." 7
A Soviet dissident, Valery Chalidze, has argued, as a matter of human
rights and in the self-interest of each nation, for the general proposition
that a convicted person be permitted to emigrate." 8 Chalidze considered
soldiers for actions which will or might involve war crimes. I would only permit the defense
here as a defense to a court martial to train others for refusal of specific acts (fire bombing,
nuclear bombing of civilians, etc.). (6) Refusal to obey combat orders. I would permit the
defense here-limited, of course, to combat orders which would involve war crimes.
3 Perhaps crimes against the peace are like obscenity: we are not able to define them, yet
we know them when we see them.
Other proposals which would permit individuals to act conscientiously on matters of war
and peace are suggested in Comment, Criminal Responsibility and the Political Offender, 24
AM. U.L. REV. 797, 826-32 (1975) (jury nullification and mitigation of sentence).
' The power of Congress to grant pardons or to amend the laws so as to have the same effect
is discussed at length in the articles cited in note 126 infra.
"I The power of the President to grant amnesty or pardon is discussed at length in the articles
cited in note 126 infra. See generally Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
"I Cf. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 349(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(7) (1976)
(renunciation of citizenship during time of war permitted if Attorney General determines that
renunciation is not contrary to national defense). My proposal would permit renunciation
during wartime by a person within the United States if he had been indicted or convicted of
draft evasion and emigrated to a friendly or neutral nation, or wanted only visitation rights
when hostilities ended.
"I Cf. id. § 241(a)(4), (b), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4), (b) (1976) (deportation of aliens convicted
of crime subsequent to admission into the United States); LEACH, supra note 17, at 436
(recounting the story of Ohio Democratic Congressman Vallandingham, who was court-
martialed for an anti-war speech and whose conviction was commuted by President Lincoln
to exile in the Confederate states; overwhelmingly nominated as the gubernatorial candidate
of the Ohio Democratic Party and having run his campaign from Canada, Vallandingham
was overwhelmingly defeated). Lynch, Exile Within the United States, in 11 CRME &
DELINQUENCY 22 (1965) (discussing Utah's conditional pardon termination statute which al-
lows convicts to leave prison on the condition they do not return to the state); Note,
Banishment-A Medieval Tactic in Modern Criminal Law, 5 UTAH L. REv. 365 (1957).
President Ford's clemency program provided for alternative service. This constituted a
conditional pardon. CLEMENCY BOARD REPORT, supra note 81, at 16.
.. See Chalidze, The Right of a Convicted Citizen to Leave His Country, 8 HAHv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 1 (1973). See also P. REMEC, THE POSITION OF THE INDVImUAL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
ACCORDING TO GROTIUS AND VA"rIEL 174 (1960) ("Vattel preserves to the individual ... the
right to abandon it, if his individual self-preservation demands it. . . especially by means
of emigration."); Maxey, Loss of Nationality: Individual Choice or Government Fiat?, 26 ALB.
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each of the rationales for imposing criminal sanctions (deterrence, rehabil-
itation, retribution) and concluded that none of them warranted the im-
prisonment of convicted citizens who wished to emigrate and who found a
country which would accept them."' Chalidze wrote that "the primary aid
of society['s] [criminal law] is that the criminal should cease to disturb
it."' 2 Another criminal law authority refers to harm rather than disturb-
ance and states that harm is the "fulcrum between criminal conduct and
the punitive sanction .... 121 The question before us is whether the dis-
turbance, or harm, caused by non-violent draft offenders is sufficient to
justify criminal punishment where the alternative of permitting the of-
fender to emigrate exists.
As I have established, non-violent draft offenses breach the moral
order only insofar as they breach the political order. Even so, one might
argue that such political crimes constitute crimes of great magnitude as
they evidence a fundamental break with the body politic. But surely, on
the spectrum of political offenses from treason,'2 2 on the one hand, to
activities otherwise protected by the first amendment on the other,' 2 non-
violent draft offenses fall closer to the latter. Such acts do evidence a
fundamental disagreement with the government and/or majority of the
body politic, but it is doubtful that, as they usually emanate from consci-
entious reflection,'12 they are directed against the body politic and/or the
government so as to harm either entity.'1
L. REv. 151, 156 n.31 (1962) ("[tlhe power to withdraw from the social community was
implicit in revolutionary philosophy .... ").
"I My proposal can be said to be in response to the invitation by the editors of Chalidze's
article to apply Chaldize's proposition to draft offenses.
I" Chaldize, The Right of a Convicted Citizen to leave His Country, 8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rav. 1, 4 (1968).
21 Robinson, A THEORY OF JUSTIFICATION: SOCIETAL HARM AS A PREREQUISITE FOR CRIMINAL
LLDAnrr, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 266, 268 n.7 (1975) (quoting Jerome Hall.)
See generally J. HURST, THE LAw OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES (1971).
Senator Thurmond made a unique argument in opposing any amnesty for Vietnam draft
evaders. He distinguished draft evaders who had disobeyed the law on an individual basis
from the Southerners of 1860. The latter "were not traitors to the Nation, they were merely
standing by their States which withdrew. ... Thus, the amnesty granted to them was
justified. Hearings on Clemency Program Practices and Procedures Before the Subcomm. on
Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Clemency Hearings]. See also Comment, Robert
Edward Lee-No Citizen He, 50 MIL. L. REv. 141 (1970) (Lee has since been renationalized).
12 See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
12, Seventy-five per cent of the civilian applicants for clemency were conscientiously opposed
to the Vietnam War. CLEMENCY BOARD REPORT, supra note 81, at 43. Fewer than five per cent
of the military applicants were so opposed. Id. at 66.
In See Eser, The Principle of "Harm" in the Concept of Crime: A Comparative Analysis of
the Criminally Protected Legal Interests, 4 DuQ. U.L. REv. 345 (1966). Eser distinguishes
between a "formal" criminal wrong which consists of a technical infraction and a "material"
criminal wrong which varies with the specific object of the criminal law imposing a sanction.
Id. at 348. I would argue that the material wrong in draft evasion is breaching the social
compact alone. Breaking the moral law by attacking the body politic or by violating an
intrinsic obligation to defend one's fellows is not material in a criminal context.
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It must be added that Congress has enacted a statute which presumes
that draft evasion, in the form of one leaving the country to avoid service,
stemmed from a cleavage so fundamental' that it justified automatic
denationalization." 7 It was probably Congress' view of constitutional law,
rather than any logical difference, which kept Congress from treating draft
evaders who remained in the country the same way. 21 I do not believe that
either the legislative presumption or its logical extension is always justi-
fied, although in particular cases it may be. Thus, my proposal would
permit the individual to decide whether his act of draft evasion stemmed
from an irreparable cleavage. If so, he would be free to depart.2 , From the
Also, Eser differentiates himself from Feuerbach (1775-1833) who, "[biased on early
liberal ideas of natural rights which obtain legal protection by a social contract between the
state and its citizens . . . believed that any attack against the state by breach of its laws is
also a violation of the individual rights the state seeks to protect." Id. at 358. Eser would not
absorb individual interests thusly into the state's general interest but would prefer that "legal
interests . . . be related to their natural basis-namely, to specific rights and needs of indi-
viduals, social groups, or the State." Id. at 380. (Note that Eser does not reject the social
contract theory upon which Feuerbach depended. Rather, he rejects Feuerbach's analysis of
it.) Using Eser's suggestion, I would argue that the individuals in a body politic do not have
an absolute right to the armed service of others. As to the government's interest in the
protection afforded by the punitive sanction meted out to draft evaders, I would argue that
the government is without an interest which would justify keeping a draft evader in jail when
there is the alternative of permitting him voluntarily to emigrate. Thus, neither individuals
nor the government have an interest in jailing putative emigrds.
121 Of course, not all draft evasion results from a permanent fundamental cleavage, else
amnesty/clemency would fail of its essential purpose: reconciliation. For a general history of
American amnesty, see CLEMENCY BOARD REPo'r, supra note 81, at 175, 345; M. SHERMAN,
AMNESTY IN AMERICA: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1974); Lusky, Congressional Amnesty for
War Resisters: Policy Considerations and Constitutional Problems, 25 VAND. L. REv. 525, 527-
28 nn.8-12 (1972); Migliore, Amnesty: An Historical Justification for Its Continuing Validity,
12 U. LOuisvn.LE J. FAM. L. 63, 78-80 (1972); Comment, Amnesty: An Act of Grace, 17 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 501, 503 n.14 (1973); Comment, Amnesty for Draft Evaders?, 10 SAN DIEo L.
REV. 176, 192-93 (1972).
President Ford's clemency program departed from "precedent" in two ways. He required
that clemency be given only with the condition of alternative service, and he created a neutral
Clemency Discharge. CLEMENCY BOARD REPORT, supra note 81, at 181.
"'I See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 349(a)(10), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(10) (1970)
(held unconstitutional, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159-86 (1963)); cf.
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 349(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(7) (1976) (renun-
ciation abroad in time of war permitted if Attorney General determines that such act is not
contrary to interests of national defense).
'2 Other countries would hold an opposite view. See CONSCIPTION: A WORLD SURVEY: COM-
PULSORY MILITARY SERVICE AND RESISTANCE TO IT app. I (D. Prasad & T. Smythe eds. 1968)
(Ecuador banned draft evaders from leaving the country as part of their punishment).
'2 In Plato's Crito and Apology, Socrates declines to flee the City which had condemned him
to death, stating that he had fully and freely participated in his City's public affairs and he
could not, by refusing to abide by the verdict of the Laws, destroy the very Laws which had
nurtured and educated him. See generally D'Amato, Obligation to Obey the Law: A Study
of the Death of Socrates, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1079 (1976); Vaughan, The Trial of Socrates:
Recent Reflections, 14 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 407 (1976). Socrates might have considered emi-
grating, however, if the City had consented to his departure. Alas, he foreclosed that possibil-
ity when he decided not to seek banishment as an alternative to the death sentence for
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viewpoint of the body politic, there would be no purpose in spending
money for his upkeep in jail. Nor would this pardon, conditioned as it
would be upon renunciation of citizenship, eliminate the deterrent effect
of convictions.
No. 4: Return of Draft Offenders as Nonimmigrant Visitors
Those individuals who leave the United States to avoid the draft
should be allowed to return as nonimmigrant visitors"'0 without fear of
prosecution, 13' once the hostilities which caused their departure have
ceased. 3 Thus, resident aliens who left the United States would be able
to return for visits to friends and relatives, and for business. More impor-
tantly, citizens of the United States who departed to avoid the draft and
have renounced their citizenship, 3 have filed a declaration of intent to
become citizens of another country,'34 or have become citizens of another
pragmatic reasons: a banished man's life was not an easy one. Herein I propose that the
United States consent to such voluntary departure to promote its own best interest.
"I Presently, draft evaders who have departed are excluded from admission to the United
States under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(a)(22) (1976). Additionally, they are deportable if found in this country following an illegal
entry under § 241(a)(1) of the same Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1) (1976).
The question whether such individuals did in fact leave the country to avoid military
service is determined by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See Clemency Hear-
ings, supra note 125, at 272-74 (correspondence between Sen. Kennedy and Dep't of Justice,
dated Mar. 11 and Apr. 18, 1975).
The Presidential Clemency Board was barred by the terms of the Executive Order which
created it from considering cases of aliens who had been found excludable under § 212(a)(22),
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(22) (1976). Exec. Order No. 11,803, § 2, 39 Fed. Reg. 33,297 (1974),
reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (Supp. V 1975). The Board did, however, take the cases of
aliens about whom no determination had yet been made. CLEMENCY BoARD REPORT, supra
note 81, at 10.
President Carter included such persons in his amnesty. Exec. Order No. 11,967, 42 Fed.
Reg. 4,393 (1977).
'31 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (1976). The fear of prosecution comes from the statutes of limitations,
see id. § 3282 (general); 50 U.S.C. app. § 462 (Supp. V 1975) (statute for failure to register),
which are tolled for fugitives.
There have been attempts, without success, to initiate preliminary proceedings, e.g.,
dismissal of indictment, on behalf of fugitive defendants. See Dawkins v. Mitchell, 437 F.2d
646 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam); United States v. Shapiro, 391 F. Supp. 689 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Vincent v. Schlesinger, 388 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1975); United States v. Lockwood,
382 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
131 An example of the limited nature of my proposal is this provision, restricting visitation
rights to the post-bellum period.
'1 See, e.g., Jolley v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 441 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 946 (1971); 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1532 (1971) (criminal charges against one who
had renounced United States citizenship dropped in favor of deportation).
"' As far as the United States is concerned, a declaration of intent to become a citizen of the
United States has little or no effect on that person's rights and privileges. See Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, § 334(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1445(f) (1976) (no right to citizenship).
I believe the filing of the declaration of intent abroad should have one effect. If the
individual wishes to return only for short visits, he should be allowed, and the government
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country'3 5 would be able to return for visits of a social or business nature.
This would be humane legislation. It would have no adverse effect on
the enforcement of our conscription laws.' 6 It can be easily accomplished
by a one-line revision of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,'11
and by an executive order which would provide for the non-prosecution of
these individuals.
should withhold prosecution for draft offenses (assuming hostilities have ceased). However,
if a permanent return is desired, the government should be free to prosecute, unless an
amnesty program is in effect.
"I As of 1974, the Justice Department was aware of only four or five draft evader expatriates.
Clemency Hearings, supra note 122, at 180. As of 1977, there were 5,000. L. BASKIR & W.
STRAUSS, RECONCILIATION AFTER VIETNAM: A PROGRAM OF RELIEF FOR VIETNAM ERA DRAFT AND
MILITARY OFFENDERS 78-80 (1977); see Calhoun, The People Amnesty Forgot, The [Toronto]
Globe and Mail, Aug. 7, 1976, at 7, col. 4.
Such individuals, without an amnesty in effect, can be prosecuted. Merely becoming a
citizen of another country does not necessarily result in the loss of one's American citizenship.
One probably becomes a dual national. See Dellapenna, The Citizenship of Draft Evaders
After the Pardon, 22 VILL. L. REv. 531 (1977). Furthermore, even if one renounced one's
citizenship, this is no bar to prosecution. See note 134 supra. Such prosecution is consistent
with treaties entered into by the United States circa 1870 and still in force under which
naturalized citizens of the United States could be prosecuted by the country of their birth
for breach of a military obligation as long as the obligation had accrued before emigration
from that country. The United States had sought these agreements to prevent naturalized
citizens from being prosecuted, upon a short return visit to their country of origin, for any
military obligation which did not arise until after emigration or any military obligation which
was supposed to have grown out of a renounced allegiance. See F. VAN DYNE, CmZENSHIP OF
THE UNITED STATES 284, 327 (1904).
'" My proposal would have no greater effect than the wide discrepancy in treatment of
offenders during the Vietnam War era. During the course of the war,, probation was increas-
ingly favored over imprisonment, and military authorities increasingly favored general dis-
charge over court-martial. A. DAMICO, DEMOCRACY AND THE CASE FOR AMNESTY 7 (1975). Dis-
missal of cases in the civil courts increased during the same period. CLEMENCY BOARD REPORT,
supra note 81, at 45. Fewer and fewer offenders were convicted. Id. at 47. Indeed, of the total
number of draft law violators who stood trial (21,400), 85% were acquitted. Id. at 46. But see
Blumstein & Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of Legal Sanctions on Draft Evasion, 29 STAN. L.
REv. 241 (1977). See also L. BASKIR & W. STRAUSS, RECONCILIATION Ars VIETNAM: A PROGRAM
OF RELIEF FOR VIETNAM ERA DRAFT AND MILITARY OFFENDERS (1977); Lockhart, Discretionary
Clemency: Mercy at the Prosecutors' Option, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 55; Sentencing Selective
Service Violators: A Judicial Wheel of Fortune, 5 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 164 (1969); W.
Markham, Draft Offenders in the Federal Courts: A Search for the Social Correlates of Justice
(1972) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania).
I Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 212(a)(22), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(22) (1976),
should be revised to read as follows:
(22) Aliens who are ineligible to citizenship, except aliens seeking to enter as
nonimmigrants; or persons who have departed from or who have remained outside the
United States to avoid or evade training or service in the armed forces in time of war
or a period declared by the President to be a national emergency, except aliens who
• . . seek to reenter the United States as nonimmigrants ....
